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Abstract

Thanks to an abundance of highly publicized data breaches, Information Security (InfoSec) is taking a larger
place in organizational priorities. Despite the increased attention, the threat posed to employers by their own
employees remains a frightening prospect studied mostly in a technical light. This paper presents a
categorization of insider deviant behavior and misbehavior based off of the neuropsychological foundations of
three main types of insiders posing a threat to an organization: accidental attackers; neurologically “hot”
malcontents, and neurologically “cold” opportunists.
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INTRODUCTION
Information Security (InfoSec) is no longer a minor concern of organizations. In
today’s social media-saturated environment, data breaches can easily become large,
publicized affairs that deal immense, sometimes irreparable blows to an
organization’s reputation (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2011). With cyberattacks
coming from all sides and news outlets on the prowl for the next sensational breach,
InfoSec professionals have increasingly turned their attention to the potential risks
posed by an organization’s own employees. Insider threat is understandably a
serious issue: the damage caused by employees or associates is rated as more
severe, costly, and difficult to detect than that of outsiders (Software Engineering
Institute [SEI], 2013). While the majority of cyberattacks still originate from noninsiders, employee attacks are still viewed with no small amount of trepidation
(SEI, 2013). Most organizations report feeling vulnerable to internally-originated
incidents and 93% are planning to increase or maintain their InfoSec budgets
accordingly—though roughly seven to nine percent of the median annual $750k IT
budget is already allocated to security (Vormetric Data Security, 2015; Filkins &
Hardy, 2016). This expansion of cybersecurity spending indicates recognition of a
vulnerability, but increased internal focus potentially comes at a cost to workplace
trust, organizational cohesiveness, and, ultimately, productivity.
Research attempts to explore causes and possible preventative approaches to
insider threat have been gaining traction. However, as Crossler et al. note, most of
these efforts tend to be geared towards the technical side of the cybersecurity
field—the focus of the research appeals to the firewall-wielding, computer-savvy
CISO, seemingly at the expense of the more managerial-minded Information
Security professionals. Crossler and his colleagues also point to a rather undefined
classification approach to insider attacks that label threat behavior as either deviant
or misbehavior, and call for a clearer separation and examination of the two
categories (Crossler et al., 2012). Loch, Carr, and Warkentin’s Four Dimensions of
Information Systems Security provides a comprehensive classification scheme for
categorizing threats by analyzing threat source, agent, motivating intent, and
potential results, and refinement by Willison and Warkentin has expanded the
category of intent to include a continuum of motives—from unintentional to fully
malicious (Lock, Carr, & Warkentin, 1992; Willison & Warkentin, 2013).
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While subsequent multidimensional approaches have sought to classify threats
in orthogonal manners, thus extending the modularity and applicability of Loch et
al.’s original classification scheme, these approaches—thanks to their intended allencompassing applicability—are not specific to insider threat (Jouini, Rabai, &
Aissa, 2014; Jouini, Rabai, & Khedri, 2015). Due to the extremely negative
emotional and financial impacts associated with the collapse of the employeeemployer trust dynamic, insider threat poses a significant enough risk to warrant its
own classification scheme (Reina & Reina, 2015).
By adopting a neuropsychological approach to investigating insider threat
behavior, we are able to better tease apart the categories of insider deviant and
misbehavior as rooted in aggression and nonaggression, respectively. We also
propose a subcategorization of insider deviant behavior based on the neurological
arousal levels of the aggression type displayed, resulting in our final categories of
accidental attackers, hot malcontents, and cold opportunists. A common approach
to uniting psychology with other management-involved fields is to pose the
motivation-concerned question of why: why do employees fall for email scams?
Why do they attack organizations? Why don’t they change their password on a
regular basis? We have been seeking to understand why employees attack their
organizations, but perhaps it is time to ask how.
With the application of a neurologically-rooted system of categorization, we not
only gain unique insight on the problem of insider threats and attacks, but we are
able to surpass previously motivation-limited approaches to understanding such
behavior on a psychological level. Armed with this information, Information
Security professionals will be able to better understand, prepare for, and circumvent
such attacks.

DANGEROUS INSIDERS
Using a traditional motive-based perspective, risks posed by employees can
initially be broken down into two major groups: insiders that bear an intent to harm
their organization, and those that do so accidentally. As previously mentioned,
Crossler et al. classify these categories of behavior as insider deviant behavior and
misbehavior, respectively (Crossler et al., 2012). The latter half, bearing no ill intent
other than a possible aversion to following good security habits, requires no further
categorization and such misbehaviors will be grouped together for the purpose of
this approach, as most unintentionally risky behaviors can be traced to distraction
or a general lack of awareness. Insiders that intend to harm their employers,
however, require deeper analysis, as deviant behavior essentially amounts to acts
of aggression.
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It likely comes as no surprise that the neurological activity behind a lapse in
attention is leagues away from that of a purposeful, aggression-based attack, but it
is important to note that not all acts of aggression are cut from the same cloth.
Motivation and context play a large role in determining how the body will process
aggression in everyday life, and the same is true of deviant employee behavior.
While both vengeance-driven sabotage and the purposeful misuse of user privileges
for financial gain both seem to be intentional, deviant acts of an aggressive nature,
they are displays of two very physiologically different types of human behavior. It
is the difference between spitefully hurling your boss’ prized decorative vase across
the room, and secretly selling it on your local Free and For Sale Facebook page
(whereas in this scenario, an accidental attacker might simply send the piece
toppling with a stray elbow).
With these differences accounted for, we wind up with three categories of insider
attacks: accidental, non-attentive, non-aggressive insiders; neurologically “hot”
malcontents aiming to cause harm; and neurologically “cold” opportunists seeking
to cut themselves a piece of organizational pie.

Figure 1: Proposed categories include “hot” anger and “cold” calculation in the
deviant category, and inattention-based threat in the misbehavior section
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Accidental Attackers
Just as the road to a familiar destination is paved with good intentions, so is the
path to insider threat lined with non-malicious motives. Here defined by a lack of
intent to harm an organization, unintentional insider threat can include accidental
disclosure of classified information, careless treatment of physical data storage
devices, and falling prey to often-obvious, sometimes-subtle phishing emails that
even well-trained, cautious employees may respond to when bogged down with
overwhelming amounts of correspondence (CERT Insider Threat Center [CERT],
2014). From a neurological perspective, unintentional insider threat behavior arises
primarily from a lapse in attention—that is, a temporarily diverted level of
consciousness. Any consequential breach of security is entirely unintended, and it
is this complete lack of malice lends the title of accidental attacker to employees in
this category.
Though the popularity of multitasking suggests otherwise, attention appears to
be a limited resource, and employees can only spend so much before they begin to
operate in the red. Though the connotations associated with words such as
“careless” and “inattentive” contain negative implications, causes contributing to
unintentional insider threat are varied and many, and the label of inattentive insider
is not meant to be a judgment of an employee’s responsibility or lack thereof.
Whatever the circumstances surrounding an accidental attacker—excess amounts
of stress imposed by a heavy workload, a lack of sleep, the presence of workplace
distractions such as a noisy coworker—the end result is the same: a lack of attention
and diminished or misdirected state of consciousness.
It may seem that the category of inattentive insiders contains mostly small
workplace sins: phishing gullibility, a misplaced USB drive, or bad browsing
habits. These seemingly small events stack up, though, as accidental data exposure
is the most common cyber incident amongst insiders (SEI, 2013).
It is worth noting that intention once again plays an important role in
distinguishing accidental threat. An intentional disregard for safe employee
practices, though similar in results to a lack of attentiveness, falls under cold threat
rather than inattentiveness. For example, insiders that violate guidelines for
workplace behavior in order to illegally download music display a willful disregard
for the expected employee behaviors. This intent to ignore codes of conduct places
them under the third category—that of cold opportunists—as he or she is choosing
to break the rules for the enjoyment that stands to be gained from such behavior.
Inattentive insiders are categorized by their lack of attention, and willful ignorance
fails to meet this qualification.
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Hot Malcontents
Deriving its name from the active state of the sympathetic nervous system, “hot”
insider attacks spawn from motives rooted in anger—and, by extension, aggression.
One of the more overpowering human emotions, anger is able to muddy one’s
ability to reason, cause extreme short-sightedness, and turn an otherwise logical
person into a raving lunatic (DeSteno & Piercarlo, 2011). Unlike negligence or
inattentiveness, anger is characterized by intense arousal of the sympathetic
nervous system—the same system that is responsible for the fear-induced fight or
flight response (Carlson, 2013). While the fight or flight response is more
commonly associated with fear, anger and fear share a number of biological
characteristics—heart rate elevation, an increase in blood pressure, and a generally
heightened state of awareness—and anger-driven insider aggression similarly runs
on such responses (Ax, 1953).
Hot malcontents possess an additional neurological edge in that this category is
essentially exclusively concerned with revenge-oriented insiders. While anger is
certainly a dominating emotion in these instances, it has been shown that acts of
vengeance activate not just the fight and flight response, but the brain’s pleasuretied reward pathways as well (de Dominique et al., 2004). The activation of these
pathways make revenge more than a simple release of anger: it is a desirable,
physiologically incentivized behavior. This neural intoxication makes hot
malcontents a heated risk indeed.
The profile of the angry insider is well-cited archetype of the InfoSec
community: an irate employee, upon discovering that they are to be demoted, fired,
or otherwise cast from their spot on the organizational ladder, takes it upon
themselves to alleviate their feelings of distress by relieving their former employer
of valuable data or equipment. One way that hot malcontent threats differ from
those of cold opportunists is that these attacks are most notably reactionary. Home
Depot’s Ricky Joe Mitchell, for example, caused former employer EnerVest nearly
one million dollars in damages to office equipment and the company network after
learning he was to be dismissed from the organization (Gallagher, 2014).
The defining characteristics of this category of insider attack are thus that they
are aggressive in nature (qualifying them as deviant behavior), reactionary, and
hold harming the organization as the primary goal of their behavior.
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Cold Opportunists
In contrast to the heated, anger-driven nature of hot insider attacks, “cold”
aggression shows much less arousal of the jittery, high-strung sympathetic nervous
system. Fraud, exploitation, intellectual theft—these are all deviant behaviors that
display aggression towards an organization, but they lack the neurological fire that
behaviors of hot malcontents possess. Similar to acts of predation, insider attacks
in this category instead fall under the jurisdiction of the calmer, more analysisfriendly parasympathetic nervous system.
This “rest and digest” division of the autonomic nervous system—which
governs the unconscious activities that keep us alive and running—is responsible
for some of the least aggressive activities known to humankind, such as sleep
(Carlson, 2013). In certain situations, however, it can serve as a platform from
which acts of aggression may be carried out. The most notable of these examples,
predation, is generally defined as occurring when a member of one species engages
in aggressive or violent behavior against a member of another species (Carlson,
2013). In the context of human behavior, we may presume to expand this definition
to include not only activities such as hunting, but circumstances in which
individuals seek to better their stations in life at the expense of others. In the absence
of the adrenaline-soaked mindset that accompanies the fight or flight response, the
focus is less on immediate survival (or vengeance, in the case of our hot
malcontents) and more on personal advancement. Since the mind is not
overwhelmed with emotion and is more capable of logical, long-term planning,
attacks in this category can be highly complex, orchestrated events that pose
massive risk towards an organization.
As the name suggests, cold opportunists are proactive rather than reactive:
instead of negatively responding to an unfavorable HR decision, they act out of
self-interest to take exploit their current situation, often financially. In the case of
William G. Sullivan, Senior Database Administrator for Certegy Check Services,
the potential gain in monetary advantages was enough to motivate Certegy Check
Service’s Senior Database Administrator to download and sell the personal records
of eight and a half million customers—a breach of monumental scale (Kendall,
2007). Unlike hot malcontents, cold opportunists are not inherently against their
employer; they are merely for themselves.
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It is in this category that we may see the greatest variety of threat, as while
financial incentives are the largest motivator of intentionally threatening insiders,
espionage is steadily on the rise, and intellectual property theft is tied with
accidental data exposure as the leading insider cyber incident (Verizon, 2016; SEI,
2013). Any ideological attacks conducted on an organization by an insider would
similarly fall under the umbrella of cold opportunism, so long as they are proactive
in nature. The defining qualifications of the cold opportunist branch of deviant
insider behaviors are as follows: that the attack be an aggressive assault on an
organization or its assets, that it be proactive in nature, and that it possess a selfserving intent on the part of the threat agent.

TRUST AND TRAITORS
When considering the multitude of ways in which employees pose serious risk
to an organization, employees might ironically seem to be too risky for an
organization to employ. The age-old and often-debated tug-of-war between the
feasible and the ideal requires little discussion, but it is worth nothing the positive
effects that trust in the workplace often beget. We spend much time focusing on the
multitude of ways in which employees cannot be trusted, and for good reason. It is
clear that our society is moving forward into an increasingly uncertain state.
Between highly publicized security breaches like that of Target and Home Depot,
and public information leaks that are only increasing in frequency, the concept of
trust may come across as foolish notion.
However, trust does not exist in a workplace for the sole purpose of being
broken: it serves to enhance performance and has a massive potential to help the
organization. If an employer can foster and maintain an environment of trust in the
workplace, not only will it reap the benefits of a harmonious, united workforce—it
will have a leg up on the competition.
These benefits are both intuitive and well-documented. Increased levels of
organizational trust lead to increased participation and engagement in employee
work, and an environment in which workers are trusted to be able to competently
fulfill their duties can lead to higher retention of talented individuals—whose
expertise the organization stands to greatly benefit from (Reina & Reina, 2015).
The Leader-Member Exchange Theory (LMX) from the Industrial/Organizational
Psychological schools of thought revolves entirely around the formation of strong
relationships between superiors and subordinates, and studies have found that high
levels of trust in this dynamic are associated with positive work performance (Chen,
Lam, & Zhong, 2012). Trust is a cornerstone of human interaction, one that cannot
be struck from the workplace.
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A Need for Control
As technology has grown smaller, portable, and even wearable, it has increased the
spread of the workplace. Employees often have work laptops, USB drives with
sensitive information, or their professional emails accessible even when not on the
premises. While this expansion of the workplace indicates the diminishing
separation of work and home—often at the expense of the domicile—it also poses
a problem for information security professionals. Namely, that employees are both
taking technology home and bringing their own personal devices to work.
The rise of supplying and utilizing personal technology in a productive
environment is not limited to industry (Elementary schools even have programs
such as BYLD that encourage students to “Bring Your Learning Device” and
incorporate cell phones into curriculum), but it is causing some anxiety for IT
decision makers. According to a 2015 survey by Vormetric, the vast majority of
these professionals are concerned with their lack of control over mobile devices in
the workplace. This worry, unfounded or not, is drawing attention when things like
high-volume data storage remain pressingly vulnerable (Vormetric Data Security,
2015).
Though the increased attention pointed toward mobile devices indicates an
elevated desire for control in an environment with innumerable variables,
increasing security presence could have unintended negative effects. It is
documented that while individuals who are not confident of their skill sets both
benefit from and appreciate close monitoring, those who are skilled tend to resent
such close attention—not only that, but their performance actually decreases in
response (Aiello & Kolb, 1995). Though insiders pose some of the greatest threats
to organizations, holding them under constant scrutiny would likely decrease both
morale and performance, and in a worst-case-scenario could actually serve to drive
away skilled employees.
The resulting conundrum is a classic one for InfoSec professionals. On one
hand, the need for a balance for reasonable security measures. On the other, the
need for effective workplace trust—especially since employee performance is
correlated with their supervisor’s perception of their ability (Dockery & Steiner,
1990). Both are necessary for maximum organizational efficiency, and it might
seem that the answer lies in some variation of “too hot, too cold, just right.” This is
certainly a viable approach, and as every organization is a unique entity, it is up to
the CISO to gauge what levels of security are appropriate for the situation. At the
end of the day, cyber security is in the business of keeping the organization
protected so that it may perform its business with confidence.
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However, since we’ve gone to the trouble of classifying types of insider threat
according to their physiology and categories of aggression, we can further extend
our understanding into supplying general courses of action to prevent such
occurrences. We’ve asked how instead of why, and answering this question is the
first step in understanding how not.

IMPLICATIONS
Since our three categories of insider threat are essentially divided based on their
types of aggression (or lack thereof), we will analyze the implications accordingly.
Despite the differing complex forces of human behavior at play, the three categories
of insider threat can be combated with a similar psychological approach. In all
regards, it boils down to a matter of perception crafting.
The human brain is already in the business of synthesizing reality. It is capable
of transducing and translating wavelengths of light into vivid, recognizable colors,
it turns the compression and rarefaction of air into comprehensible language, and it
regularly takes rhythmic utterances and extracts from them meaningful
information. The brain has often been portrayed as nature’s greatest supercomputer,
but its remarkable processing power can be attributed in part to the fact that it takes
shortcuts—as evidenced by the lengthy list of human biases to be found.
Confirmation biases, stereotyping, hindsight bias—these often be the result of the
brain attempting to “fill in the gaps” in an effort to save time and keep us alive. And
because we only ever perceive what our brains feed us, we fall prey to these biases
time and time again. Perception governs our world. Whether it is used knowingly,
accidentally, or seldom at all, it is one of the greatest tools in the InfoSec toolbox.
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Averting Accidents
“Accidents happen,” certainly, but when working for a business that wants results
twice as good in half the time, it hardly makes for an acceptable excuse when an
employee falls for a phony email and winds up infecting half the network with a
virus. Luckily, a lack of attention is easily and intuitively addressed through
education, training, and no small amount of promotional merchandise. Training
programs have been documented to reduce the risk of unintentional insider threat
(UIT), and creating a culture of mindfulness within the workplace will help draw
attention to good browsing habits (CERT, 2014). If a lack of attention or awareness
is the main cause of unintentional insider threat, the immediate goal should be to
draw attention to the problematic behaviors.
To further deter UIT, employees must perceive their careless activity as harmful
to the organization, and, by extension, themselves. Reframing the organization’s
interests as being the individual worker’s is a long-held, upstanding approach to
encouraging desired behaviors. While fully harnessing a person’s incredibly
powerful intrinsic motivation (“I want this”) remains out of reach, it is another
matter entirely to attempt to convince someone that a behavior is in their best
interest (“I should want this”). Doing so is hailed as one of the most effective ways
to influence behavior (Carnegie, 1936), and InfoSec professionals can harness this
approach in several ways. For example, promoting the idea that good employees
practice good security incentivizes desirable habits in individuals who want to be
exemplary workers. Framing desired organizational behaviors as beneficial to
employees turns the activities from chores into self-rewarding habits.
While awareness posters and other promotional material reminding employees
of acceptable organizational behaviors is certainly a step in the right direction, it
loses its value if it is posted and then allowed to fallow. New additions to an
environment tend to draw the eye, but once the mind has accepted an item (a poster,
in this case) as part of the surrounding landscape, it is expected to be there, and thus
is paid little attention, as the brain can and often does safely assume it will continue
to occupy that space. Promotional material should therefore be cycled through on a
regular basis, in order to keep the message of conscientiousness fresh in the minds
of employees. With carefully-designed materials and a pointed effort to improve
awareness, our accidental attackers stand a much better chance of recognizing and
avoiding risky employee misbehavior.

Cooling Tempers
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To prevent “hot malcontents” from figuratively (or perhaps literally) setting fire to
an organization’s assets, the goal is to expand the perception of belonging to the
organization.
Since the aggression behind these types of insider attacks is fueled by the same
mechanisms that react when an individual is faced with a threat to safety (the fight
or flight-based sympathetic nervous system), the counteraction to best prevent such
behavior would be to avoid triggering the system in the first place. Completely
avoiding such arousal is beyond the scope of our ability, however, and as such we
must again turn to crafting perception.
We tend to view antagonists as being either against us or for themselves, and it
is in an organization’s best interests to avoid the former. If an employee perceives
that the organization is out to get them, he or she is probably much more likely to
take news of their firing/demotion/layoff negatively than if the organization is
simply struggling to survive. Framing any potentially upsetting firing decisions in
the light of the organization trying to remain afloat may help in this regard.
However, employers should hesitate before adopting an overly formal letter of
discontinued employment, as this might be seen as a complete disregard for an
employee’s contributions to the company (Reina & Reina, 2015). Courtesy and
appreciation are paramount in these tense situations. If there is no way to avoid
conflict, though, it is advised that a close eye be kept on any vulnerable assets.
Luckily, patterns of aggression can often be traced throughout an individual’s
life, and an organization that conducts background checks on potential employees
would do well to take any indications of such behavior into account. Rogue network
administrator Terry Childs of San Francisco infamy, for example, spent time in
prison for aggravated assault years before he seized control over the city’s
FiberWAN network (Venezia, 2008).

Deterring Opportunists
It must first be noted that there are some individuals who will resist deterrence by
even the most proactive of organizational measures. However, several patters of
risk behavior can be applied to insider threat scenarios, allowing for a better
understanding of what factors might succeed in staving off cold opportunists. In the
context of risks made for personal gain, perception is both a powerful player and a
useful tool, especially considering the more complex and logically conceived
behaviors in this category.
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Psychologists David DeSteno and Piercarlo Valdesolo describe the manner in
which violence against others is justified: through a dehumanization of the
opposing force and a breaking down of the ways in which an individual can relate
to their newfound enemy (DeSteno & Valdesolo, 2011). The enemy becomes
“other,” making them unlike ourselves and thus leaving no place for empathy,
which is reserved for those whom we can relate to. This disconnect enables
individuals to commit behaviors that would otherwise require a state of extreme
emotional arousal to engage in. An individual can literally think themselves out of
committing a morally reprehensible act—and do so quite often. This is a pattern
that sees repetition throughout much of history, from colonial slavery to the
Holocaust, and it is a longstanding testament to the power of perception.
Part of this is because of how perception mediates the relationship between risk
behavior and outside environmental influences. Individuals who perceive their
circumstances as undesirable repeatedly tend to underestimate the risks of their
decisions (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). To rephrase in the context of cyber security, an
unhappy employee who has more to gain by abusing their access for fraudulent
purposes is more likely to view the risks of engaging in such behavior as less than
they actually are, thus increasing the chances of an insider incident. One approach
to combating this would again be to pay careful attention to fostering a strong,
united workplace. The majority of activities that break workplace trust are small
incidents that accumulate over time, so an effort to ensure that emails are responded
to promptly, appropriate employees are consulted for their opinions, and staplers
are not stolen can help dissipate some of the damage done to trust in the workplace
(Reina & Reina, 2015).
Visibly flaunting the organization’s InfoSec department could also potentially
help deter cold opportunists by promoting the perception of the organization’s
systems as well-guarded. Since attacks in this category are made without the
hotheaded sympathetic arousal of Hot Malcontents, reason plays a much larger role
in the decision to attempt to turn against one’s employer. If the organization
frequently advertises the fact that their assets are carefully maintained, the risks of
being caught may very well outweigh the potential advantages to be gained from
fraud or thievery. Subtly flaunting the strength of an organization’s security can
have other benefits, too—a CISO can cultivate an image through normal,
awareness-promoting activities within the business. Practicing good security
therefore doesn’t only increase within-organizational awareness, it can deter
insiders and help create a better working environment as well.

https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/ccerp/2016/Student/9

12

Whitman: Brain Betrayal: A Neuropsychological Categorization of Insider At

CONCLUSIONS
While neuropsychology and other brain-related subjects may still seem like a
distant, laboratory-limited field of study, it is currently rapidly expanding. This era
has been dubbed “The Century of the Brain” by many a scientist, and understanding
how neurophysiological pathways influence and play into the behaviors we
encounter every day can give twenty-first century businesses an edge. Though the
field of applied neuropsychology could stand more attention, the secrets of human
behavior are nevertheless being slowly unraveled, and it is up to the InfoSec
professionals of the future to weave these new understandings into our
organizations.
As it applies to insider threat, neuropsychology can help further define and
classify employee misbehavior and insider deviant behavior into physiologicallyrooted categories. While accidental attackers unintentionally expose their
organization through any number of careless misbehaviors, deviant behaviors
house the more malevolent, aggression-related attacks. Neurologically hot
malcontents react to negative events with the intent to destroy organizational
property, while the category of cold opportunists allows for a separation of
aggressive events in which the employee holds his or her personal interests as the
highest priority rather than the destruction of the organization.
Armed with a better understanding of how employees are psychologically able
to pose a threat to their employer, CISOs may take another step on the long road
toward a broader utilization of modern understandings of human behavior.
Psychology and management are tightly intertwined. This will only become truer
as our knowledge of both fields expands.
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